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THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
At the end of World War II, Japanese forces occupied the Korean Peninsula and were ordered to surrender by their government. To facilitate this surrender and their withdrawal, the Allied powers arranged for the Soviet Union to accept and monitor their withdrawal north of the 38th parallel and the United States to accept their surrender south of the 38th parallel.
At the time, the United States supported the restoration of a sovereign Korean state and its right to self-determination. It never intended that this division between the southern and northern zones would be become permanent. The United States and its allies had pledged that a unified Korea would become a free and independent nation. These incidents have included attacks on UN personnel, sinking of South Korean military and civilian ships, tunneling under and random shooting across the Demilitarized Zone, and a plot to murder the president of the Republic of Korea. 4 Today the separation between the two Koreas is still very much a reminder of that war and the following Cold War that came
after, a war that ended elsewhere over a decade ago.
For nearly five decades, the United States has maintained a close defense relationship with the Republic of Korea as a result of a mutual defense treaty. However, over the last few years During the December 2002 presidential campaign, there was a rising tide of anti-US sentiment, with calls for the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to be revised and in some cases for US troops to leave the peninsula. Roh's election support was deeply rooted in those making these cries for change, and he publicly called for the development of an independent security policy to satisfy these constitutes. However, shortly after his inauguration, he has since reiterated his backing of US involvement in Korean affairs. 17 In March 2003, Roh stated "The staunch Korea-US combined defense arrangement is greatly contributing to our national security. The solid alliance should be maintained even more so, there can be no change whatsoever in that principle." promote economic cooperation based on a principle of reciprocity, and achieve peaceful nation unification in the long run on the basis of the superiority of its economics, politics, society, and culture. 20 Over the last decade South Korea has experienced a boom in economic and political development. This newfound growth and independence has brought on a more selfconfident public with a more independent attitude toward itself and the United States. 21 This independent attitude has fostered a growing anti-American sentiment by a minority and has begun to accentuate the differences in regional policy views. At the forefront of these growing policy differences and a root cause of the growing anti-Americanism is concern over the US strategy toward North Korea. This small but growing anti-American segment of the population also questions the need for the U.S. military presence on the peninsula. They see the U.S. troops not as guarantors of security but as obstacles to reunification. Korea or the collapse of the regime; the representatives gave priority to avoiding collapse even at the expense of the proliferation issue. 27 These views reflect important cultural differences as much as they are policy differences. 40 At the end of the six-nation Asian-Australian tour, President
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Bush said
His meetings with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun have helped move the North Korean threat from a purely U.S. issue to a regional problem. Kim Jong-il is used to being able to deal bilaterally with the United States, but the change in policy now is, that he must deal with other nations, mostly China. What's changed is, we've gotten five countries involved and the neighborhood is now speaking…and now he's got his big neighbor to the right on his border, he's got his neighbor to the south, he's got Japan, he's got another neighbor, Russia, all saying the same thing. It's a different dynamic. 41 This change in policy by China and its apparent readiness to cooperate with the United States on these types of issues constitutes one of the largest uncertainties faced by both Washington and Seoul in trying to predict possible Chinese motives.
THE STATUS OF NORTH KOREA
No government in the world is more reclusive, more suspicious of contact with the outside world, more isolated, and more devoted to absolute control and secrecy than North Korea. 42 The economic crisis of the 1990's, led to a famine that killed more than 2 ½ million people, or 10% of the population of the country, and has caused irreversible changes to the order and the system that supports it. 43 Over the last decade North Korea has continued to experience an economic decline: food shortages in many regions of the north, significant drops in industrial production as well as aging military weapons systems, resulting in a relative decline in economic capacity and military readiness. 44 At the same time they continue to allocate nearly 25 percent of their declining GNP to military expenditures and the number of people serving in the armed forces has remained largely constant if not even increased in some ways. 45 Despite this, North Korea's military is faced with major fuel shortages, reduced defense industrial output, and has been routinely observed performing duties outside the scope of its conventional duties. Coupled with limitations on spare parts these constraints have certainly impeded any advancement in military preparations.
Unfortunately, the degree of degradation in military capabilities is difficult to accurately depict. 46 In contrast with the economic instability, and in spite of it being more than ten years since the fall of the Soviet Union, and nearly eight years since the death of long time leader
Kim IL Sung, the political arm of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's remains relatively intact. In fact, the designation of Kim IL Sung's son, Kim Jong IL as successor to leading positions in the party, state, and military channels suggest both the full confirmation of his personal power and the absence of any immediate challenge to his political dominance. 47 However, in spite of North Korea's political durability and resiliency, Pyongyang's deteriorating economic and strategic fortunes over the past decade suggests that the status quo in North Korea will ultimately become unstable. Over time, absent a level of sustained external support and an ability to exploit the opportunities afforded by international food, energy, and humanitarian assistance, some systematic disruption or challenge at either the regime or state level appears increasingly likely. 48 Over the years the North Korean Government has recognized and even managed to leverage its acute economic situation and its energy and food shortages by playing to the international community for support for aid in hopes of preventing a major humanitarian crisis. Until recently, the North Korean government operated a public distribution system, or PDS, which was used to provide both food and many material needs to the majority of the population. The PDS was used to promote loyalty to the regime and prevent or limit the travel of the population and distributed based on a combination of social rank, the importance of one's profession to the state, and political status. 49 Along with South Korea's openly stated policy to not starve out the North Koreans, the United States also contributes food and energy supplies prolonging an economic collapse. A policy of continued international assistance may be necessary with respect to provisions of energy supplies and foodstuffs if the intent is to keep North Korea alive economically at least in the near to mid term. A policy North Korea has taken full advantage of to include using it as a past and recent negotiating tool with the United States over its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Despite the North's capacity to leverage both the United States and South Korea and the mixed signals it may send, both countries have concluded that keeping North Korea afloat in the near term serves the interests of both countries. At the same time, the Republic of Korea's stated policy of nonabsorption can be viewed as a means to reassure the North about the South's intentions. 50 Although this may again send mixed signals to many around the world, to include the North Koreans, it is assumed that this is closely managed to only sustain or prolong the North and not to fully resurrect it or prevent unification. It should also be seen as an effective strategy to facilitate meaningful change within North Korea, and be understood that it does not lessen the possibility of instability. In fact, depending on the distribution of international aid (stuffs and energy supplies), it may even enhance North
Korean military capability as it is well suspected that the DPRK military gets a good portion of the aid that pours in from the outside. forces for possible future strategic requirements.
REALIGNMENT OF FORCES
As the United States weighs its interests in
In Secretary Rumsfeld's view, moving U.S. troops away from the DMZ and consolidating them at perhaps two main hub bases south of Seoul will create a more formidable fighting force and strengthen South Korea's defenses, not weaken it. 54 This will also give the forces more flexibility to train for missions elsewhere in the region. In addition to the forces along the DMZ this new plan, if implemented, would also move most of the 8 th Army, headquartered in the capital of Seoul, to the south as well. This realignment not only makes both tactical and strategic sense, but also serves to diminish public hostility toward these forces and those occupying the capital of Seoul, a source of political controversy.
UPGRADING TO REGIONAL SECURITY
Although a lot can happen between now and the time that the two Korea's unify, both the U.S. and the ROK need to be preparing for the eventuality of a collapse of the North and the new challenges that will occur within the region beyond unification. Assuming that the South Korean government requires U.S. assistance, or the U.S. acts unilaterally in it's best interests, both governments will be faced with a variety of scenarios and missions. In the event of a rapid and unexpected collapse, and assuming that South Korea accepts responsibility for rebuilding the North, (versus a scenario where the Chinese government steps in and annexes North Korea prior to total collapse) both the United States and the South Korean armed forces would immediately be faced with a broad range of missions: This would also require a gamut of responses in order to maintain stability. Direct negotiations with key leaders within the army to determine control, intentions, and whether effective control over key WMD still exists would be a priority.
Any one of these scenarios or combinations of any of these pose a significant operational challenge for the combined forces of both South Korea and the United States.
Rather than a seamless unification, any one of these scenarios will bring potentially unanticipated problems requiring a long-term commitment.
It should be clear that both governments agree that North Korea is still a viable threat to the security of the peninsula and that U.S. presence is still required for ROK security. In addition, it is only natural that even allies do not always see eye to eye on every national interest and some differences in policy views are likely. The fact that the United States views North Korea as a threat to its national security may not be a welcome view with all Koreans.
The differences between U.S. and ROK strategy toward North Korea might even strain relations and cause tension in South Korea. This is to be expected. Korean attitudes towards the United States are layered and complex. One option is for the South Korean government to step up their own commitment by moving to a professional military force, away from the use of conscripts and commit more of their newfound prosperity toward their own defense. This would also require increasing the size of their army to meet the threat posed to them and allow the United States to consider other options. If this option is discarded, the South Korean government has the responsibility to convince its public that the U.S. presence is still required.
Even after the threat of North Korea disappears, the existing military alliance between South Korea and the United States should be continued and even expanded to a regional alliance to meet the future-changing environment. The presence of United States forces in the region will act as a stabilizer from the possible growing rivalry between China, Japan and Korea. The United States' relationship in the region should move from a bilateral alliance with South Korea aimed at keeping North Korea in check, to one of a regional focus with the intent of maintaining stability in Northeast Asia. 58 Establishing closer and favorable ties with China will be crucial in this process in light of the possibility of instability that each of these scenarios could trigger. Intentions should be reviewed and outlined during the six party talks and direct country-to-country negotiations to avoid possible unilateral action,
should there be an unexpected collapse.
The United States has few options short of abandoning its commitment with South Korea but to exercise its hegemonic powers in support of its interests.
Consistent with previous national strategies, stating that overseas presence promotes stability, helps prevent conflict, and ensures the protection of U.S. interests. The United
States should continue to remain in Korea to protect against the current threat from North Korea and to promote peace and regional stability within the region beyond unification. In the near term, the U.S. should move its bases to facilitate both current tactical readiness issues but also posture itself for the challenges of the future and to facilitate its interests as a strategic deterrent within the region.The United States has maintained that an adjustment of its forward-deployed forces in Korea is a sovereign choice that requires neither approval nor permission from the host nation. 59 However, to prevent the rising tide of anti-Americanism from spiraling out of control putting the South Korean government into a predicament between their population and U.S. interests, both Washington and Seoul need to convey that any troop rebalancing is not a manifestation of fears and snap decisions made on a deteriorating alliance, but rather an investment in the long-term resiliency of a more equal and mature alliance with greater capabilities and less intrusive footprint. 60 WORD COUNT= 6,261
